Foreign exchange and U.S. balance-of-payments developments in 1972 and early 1973 by Christopher Bach
HE MAGNITUDE of the U.S. balance-of-pay-
ments deficit and concern about the effective opera-
tion of the international monetary systemn dominated
thinking about U.S. payments problems and policies
in 1972. The same concerns had been paramnount in
1971. The overall U.S. deficit during 1972 was reduced
to $10.3 billion from $29.8 billion in 1971 as net short-
tenn capital outflows subsided. But many of the same
international monetary problems were present in both
years, in spite of a multilateral agreement in De-
cember 1971 to devalue the dollar, realign other parity
values, and widen the permissible range of exchange
rate fluctuation.
The basic problem for the international monetary
system was the same in 1972 as in 1971. The system
could not promote effective balance-of-payments ad-
justment, given the conflicting policy objectives of
fixed parity rates and the pursuit of independent do-
mestic stabilization policies. The conflict became more
intense as the integration of national economies and
capital markets continued. Thus, persistent payments
surpluses and deficits continued, thereby creating a
gap between the official international values of cur-
rencies and their domestic values.
While the long-run problem for the international
monetary system was lack of balance-of-payments
adjustment, the short-run problem in both years was
controlling the large scale international capital flows
that were generated by the increased awareness that
prevailing parity rates were inappropriate. To stem
these flows, at a timne when infiationamy pressures were
still present, most major nations instituted controls on
banks and other financial institutions. However, as
these actions proved insufficient, several countries
adopted some form of flexible exchange rate,1
‘Large scale capital flows were most evident from late June to
early July 1972 and from January to early March 1973. How-
ever, over the remainder of the fifteen-month period under
discussion, capital flows were significantly- smaller than in
1971. The reduction in capital flows largely reflected the
more realistic set of exchange rates that had been adopted
at the end of 1971.
As 1972 ended only mmnor progress had been made
toward basic changes in the international monetary
system. In addition, sufficiently rapid progress toward
further reduction in the overall U.S. payments deficit
in 1973 seemned, to some observers, to be problemati-
cal at best. Given this outlook, and pressured by the
unprecedented capital movements associated with the
monetary crisis of late January and February 1973,
the United States moved further early this year to
carry forward its policy of reducing the U.S. payments
deficit. The program announced by Treasury Secre-
tary Shultz on February 12 included not only a ten
percent devaluation of the dollar, but also proposals
for comprehensive trade legislation, and a decision to
phase out U.S. direct controls on capital movements
by the ençl of 1974. These moves reflected the Ad-
ministration’s belief that the best path toward a
viable international monetary system, and trade
and payments equilibrium, was through a more com-
petitive market environment with appropriate parity
rates — not through controls and restrictions on inter-
national exchange.
FOREIGN EXChANGE DEVELOPMENTS
The major foreign exchange developments in 1972
and early 1973 can be divided into three time periods:
the period preceding the sterling crisis of late June
and early July; the period during the sterling crisis
until the close of 1972; and the period of international
monetary turmoil in early 1973.
Prior to the Sterling Crisis
Following the Smithsonian agreement of December
1971, exchange rates of most major nations settled
near the floor of their newly prescribed ranges, but
moved rapidly upward in the first two months of 1972.
During this period, there was considerable concern
over the viability of the new set of parity rates. The
greatest uncertainty arose because of the fear that
some countries might not maintain the convertibility
of their currencies at the limits set by the Smithsonian
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agreement. Several central banks intervened in their
respective foreign exchange markets as their curren-
cies approached their ceilings relative to the dollar.
These actions were necessary to stem successive pe-
riods of foreign exchange pressure on the mark, guil-
der, Belgian franc, and the yen. The net conversion
of dollar assets into assets denominated in other cur-
rencies continued, but at a much lower rate than imi
the second half of 1971.
From mnid-March to early June there was relative
calm in the foreign exchange markets. Early in the
period European autlmorities and U.S. officials reaf-
firmed their confidence in the new exchange rate
relationships and the United States pledged that
monetary policy would not become too stimulative.
Major European currencies backed away from their
ceilings relative to the dollar in late March and April.
The Germans moved to strengthen capital controls
by further restricting borrowing abroad by German
corporations, and the Japanese reinstated controls on
nonresident purchases of yen. Discount rate cuts were
announced in Germany, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands to encourage domestic growth and discourage
large capital infloxvs. U.S. short-term interest rates
began to rise sharply, and total capital outflows from
the United States temporarily abated.
percent.2 The European Community (EC) mnonetary
agreemnent thus created a double system of exchange
rate hmits, in which the 2h percent EC band (re-
ferred to as the “snake”) was entirely contained, and
free to move, within the larger 43~percent Smith-
sonian band (referred to as the “tunnel”). A critical
feature of the European Community agreement was
that intervention in dollars was to be confined to
situations in which an EC currency declined or rose
to the full limits of its Smithsonian floor or ceiling.
Otherwise, maintenance of currency convertibility at
the 2i~ percent band was to be carried out by inter-
vening in each other’s currencies.
The period of relative exchange market calm and
temporary European experimentation with a narrowed
exchange rate band came to an abrupt halt in mid-
June. Downward speculative pressures on sterling
resulted in a decision by U.K. officials to cease inter-
vening in the foreign exchange market and to permit
the exchange rate to be determined by market forces.
Thus, on June 23, after six days and an expenditure
of $2.6 billion, the British authorities suspended their
participation in the Smithsonian and EC currency
arrangements. On June 26, Denmark also temporarily
Table i
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The Sterling Crisis and After
On May 1 the United Kingdom joined with its
2
The original am,ouncement by the European Commnunity
prospective Common Market partners in an agree- (EC) countries of their intentuon to narro\v the margin of
fluctuation among their own currencies to 2% percent was
ment to narrow the spread between sterling and any n,ade on March 7. The arrangement came into operation
other Common Market currency to no more than 2h among the original EC currencies on April 24.
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withdrew from the EC monetary agreement, while
Italy secured temporary authorization to keep the lira
within the 2ii percent EC band by intervening in
dollars rather than in European currencies.
Throughout the period, speculative attention turned
toward the dollar amid concern that either the
Smithsonian or EC rate structures and commitments
would be abandoned, and that European currencies
would move upward relative to the dollar, either
singly or jointly. In order to reduce large capital in-
flows, Switzerland and Germany imposed additional
restrictions on foreign transfers of funds into their
currencies. Even so, flows into the strong European
currencies and the yen continued. From June 15 to
July 14, the sterling crisis resulted in major countries
other than the United Kingdom acquiring $6 billion
as they absorbed dollars in exchange for their own
currencies.
As its part in calming the summer speculative crises,
the United States renewed limited operations in the
foreign exchange markets which it had suspended on
August 15, 1971. On July 19, 1972, the Federal Re-
serve System, in cooperation with the Bundesbank,
initiated several sizable operations in German marks
in the New York market. On August 10, the System
initiated similar action for the Belgian franc. In total,
the Federal Reserve intervened in the market on nine
occasions between July 19 and September 1, and in
the process sold $31.5 million of foreign currencies.
In the last quarter of the year, foreign exchange
market pressures arising from capital flows subsided,
and the EC exchange rates moved down from their
ceiling rates relative to the dollar. Some dollar bal-
ances were transferred hack to the United States as a
result of the strong recovery in the U.S. economy and
progress that had been made in the fight against
inflation. At the close of the year, the effective trade-
weighted devaluation of the dollar vis-á-vis eleven
major countries amounted to just over 10 percent from
pre-June 1970 parities, or about the same level as at
the end of January 1972.
Pressures on the Japanese yen intensified during the
last half of the year, reflecting the continued sizable
surplus in the Japanese balance of payments. The
Japanese surplus position was accentuated by the
relative cyclical positions of major nations. Japanese
exports to the United States rose especially sharply
as the U.S. recovery progressed. Japanese imports
also rose at a rapid rate in 1972, but the increase was
insufficient to offset the rise in exports. Throughout
the period, Japanese authorities purchased large
amounts of dollars in the foreign exchange markets to
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keep the value of the yen from rising above its
Smithsonian ceiling. Forward yen rates remained sub-
stantially above the Smnithsonian ceiling reflecting
market expectations of a further revaluation of the
yen.
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The capital flows which led to the dollar devalua-
tion on February 12, 1973 were of record proportions.
In the closing days of January and the first nine days
of February, about $9 billion was accumulated by
central banks in strong currency countries. Germany
acquired more than $6 billion, Japan about $1.5
billion, and other countries about $1.5 billion.
U.S. liabilities to foreign central banks and official
agencies increased by nearly $9 billion in the first
three weeks of February, as dollars were transferred
from private to official foreigners. Direct outflows of
dollars from the United States apparently covered
a broad spectrum of transactions, including leads and
lags in trade and other international payments, port-
folio shifts, and foreign borrowing from the United
States.
The immediate reaction to the U.S. devaluation and
statement on trade and financial policy on February
12 was a brief abatement of large scale capital flows.
Countries which had previously established capital
controls retained them until they found out how viable
the new exchange rate relationships would be. Japan,
as part of the agreement to reduce currency specula-
tion, permitted the yen to float relative to other cur-
rencies. France and Germany retained the same parity
value relative to each other and both effectively ap-
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preciated ten percent against the dollar. The United
Kingdom maintained the flexible exchange rate policy
it had established during the sterling crisis in the
summer of 1972. However, the U.S. devaluation did
not succeed in restoring confidence in dollar parity
rates, and amid talk of a joint EC float, the dollar was
again heavily sold and official currency markets were
closed on March 2. They remained closed until
March 19.
Short-term arrangements to control capital flows
which were agreed upon during the week of March
12, resulted in a joint float against the dollar by some
European currencies!~ As part of the agreement,
Germany announced an additional three percent re-
valuation of the mark. Japan, Italy, and the United
Kingdom elected to allow their currencies to float
against all currencies.
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS ANALYSIS
The overall balance-of-payments deficit of the
United States, while still far from balance, diminished
sharply in 1972. The official settlements deficit de-
clined from $29.8 billion in 1971 to $10.3 billion in
1972. The improvement of 1972 over 1971 occurred
in the capital accounts, Most of it consisted of a re-
duction in short-term capital outflows, But in addition,
there was a marked reduction of U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad. By contrast, trade and current account
deficits were considerably larger than in earlier years.
Current Account
The trade account, which is the largest component
of the current account, increased from a $2.7 billion
deficit in 1971 to a $6.8 billion deficit in 1972. The
deterioration can generally be attributed to (1) the
relative income, output, and price trends in major
industrial nations and the United States, and (2) the
initial impacts of the parity rate adjustmnents made in
December 1971. Both factors are discussed below.
As a general rule, movements of U.S. nonagricul-
tural exports are related to income, output, and price
movements in other industrial nations relative to those
in the United States, The accompanying chart shows
the total effect of these movements, and indicates the
cyclical nature of U.S. exports. The rate of expansion
in foreign industrial production varied between five
and ten percent over the decade, and resulted in
tm
The European countries currently participating in the joint
float are Germany, France, the Netherlands, l3elgiuun, Luxem-
burg, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
wider and nearly simultaneous fluctuations in U.S.
export growth. An increase in the rate of expansion of
foreign industrial production in 1967 and 1968 was
followed by a rise in U.S. export growth, and a sub-
sequent decline in the rate of expansion of foreign
industrial production in 1970-71 was followed by a
decrease in U.S. export growth. U.S. export growth
rose sharply in 1972, in line with renewed business ex-
pansion in most major nations and improved price
performance in the United States relative to its major
trading partners.
Movements in U.S. imports are primarily related to
changes in total demand for goods and services in the
United States. U.S. imports are also cyclical in their
response to domestic output and price pressures.
Variations in U.S. GNP growth over the past decade
were accompanied by siniultaneous, but wider, fluc-
tuations in import growth. The business expansion in
the United States was accompanied by a sharp rise in
imports in 1972, even though domestic inflationary
pressures in other major countries were greater than
in the United States.
Analysis of the U.S. trade balance in 1972 must
also account for the impact of the parity rate re-
alignment of December 1971. An objective of the
realignment as far as the United States was concerned
was to raise the dollar price of its imports and lower
Determinants of U.S. Foreign Trade Position
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Page 17Another issue concerning the impact of the devalu-
ation on the U.S. trade position is how long it will take
to achieve complete adjustment to the new set of
parity rates. The adjustment process is likely to be
rather lengthy because producers in both devaluing
and revaluing countries may respond not only by im-
mediately changing prices offered to buyers, but by
altering investment, production, and marketing plans
as profit positions change over the intermediate or
long run. Only when these basic management deci-
sions have been made and implemented will there be
a marked change in the quantities supplied, or a shift
in the destination of exports. The same producer deci-
sions will affect the length of time it takes to signifi-
cantly alter quantities of imports.4
4
Econometric evidence regarding demand and supply price
elasticities in foreign trade provides a wide range of different
results, even for individual countries. Moreover, it could be
doubted whether elasticities calculated Over an observation
period in which year-to-year changes in relative prices were
typically small and, for a number of countries, predominantly
in one direction, would necessarily be applicable to a large
discrete change, particularly one which ~vent in the opposite
direction to the previous persistent movement. A further
complication is that despite the widely held vie’v that pant
changes take two years or more to work through in ful
econometric evidence of lags of this length is weak or
nonexistent.
An equally difficult problem is the assessment of the
changes in relative prices to which price elasticities should be
applied. There ‘vas no previous experience that indicated how
itemational traders would adjust prices following a general
realignment of currencies. There was a presumption that
countries with little or no change in their effective exchange
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rate would show little or no change in export prices (corn-
pared to what they otherwise would have been), expressed
in their own local currencies. Likewise, there was a presump-
tion that countries undergoing effective devaluation (revalua-
tion) would be expected to raise (lower) their local currency
export prices, to an extent that would depend, among other
things, on exporters’ profit margins and the import content of
exports. A source of complication was that, in the past, there
seemed to have been a tendency for exporters in other coun-
tries to treat the United States as a separate market for pur-
poses of price setting. Consequently, they tended to gear their
dollar prices in the United States to U.S. domestic prices. For
most other countries, import prices appeared to be largely
determined by the general level of other countries export
prices.
For a further discussion of these points as they apply to
particular countries, see the analysis of the parity rate realign-
ment in OECD, Economic Outlook (July 1972).
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the foreign currency price of its exports. These factors
were expected to lead ultimately to an increase in the
rate of growth of export volume and a decrease in the
rate of growth of import volume.
The extent to which the U.S. trade position will be
affected by the devaluation depends upon the re-
sponsiveness of the growth in volume of exports and
imports to relative price changes. Imports which are
relatively insensitive to price changes, such as fuels
and lubricants, would be expected to increase in total
dollar value because the dollar price of U.S. imports
would be raised while the growth of import volume
would be little changed from previous growth
patterns. For imports which are relatively sensitive to
price changes, such as semi-manufactured materials
and consumer products, the rise in dollar prices would
be accompanied by a relatively greater decline in the
growth of import volume. The same principles would
be expected to hold for price and volume relation-
ships of exports. Increased growth in export volume
would be expected for those goods which are rela-
tively sensitive to price changes, such as finished
manufactures, as a result of the decline in foreign
currency prices of U.S. exports.
In the interim, the initial impact of the dollar de-
valuation on the U.S trade balance in 1972 was to
raise the dollar price of imports with relatively little
short-run response in volume to the price changes.
U.S. export volume may have responded slightly to
the lower foreign currency prices of U.S. goods. Over
the course of the year, there was probably little net
effect of the new parity rates on the trade balance.
The trade deficit increased in the first four months of
1972, and diminished slowly, on balance, during the
last eight months.
The invisibles balance, another major component
of the current account consisting primarily of net
investment income and service transactions, rose to a
$1.2 billion deficit in 1972 from near balance in 1971.
The deterioration may have been due, in part, to the
cyclical upswing in the United States. There had been
hope that the invisibles balance might shift to a sur-
plus in 1972 because of a substantial rise in U.S. com-
panies’ earnings abroad and the favorable effect of
the dollar devaluation on the dollar equivalent of
earnings converted from foreign currencies, However,
the repatriated income from U.S. direct and other
overseas investments was largely offset by the sharp
rise in income paid to foreigners on their investments
in the United States. Much of the income payment
took the form of interest paid on U.S. Government
securities which had been acquired mainly by for-
eign central banks as a result of past U.S. payments
deficits and recent international currency crises.
Long- ann Short-Term Capital
Several fundamental factors were responsible for
the sharp reduction of both long- and short-term net
capital outflows in 1972 over 1971. First, the realign-
ment of parity rates and continued international
cooperation among major nations helped to reestab-
lish confidence in international financial relationships.
With the exception of the June-July period and the
January-March 1973 crisis, investors had less incentive~
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recession, there was considerably less demand by outflows of $6 billion and $7.8 billion in 1970 and
foreign affiliates for plant and equipment expendi-
tures in 1972 compared to 1970 and 1971. Another
factor responsible for reducing net long-term private
capital outflows was the significant increase in net
foreign purchases of U.S. securities. Foreign direct
investment in the United States also increased.
Short-term capital outflows also diminished sharply
from the previous year. Gertain nonliquid short-term
private capital outflows (mainly loans by b~mksand
nonbanks to finance foreign trade) diminished from
$2.4 bffiion in 1971 to $1.6 billion in 1972. Because
some speculative capital flows may have been regis-
tered in this account last year, it is not possible to
determine how much of the reduction represents a
change in trend and how much a reduction in specu-
lative capital flows.
Errors and omissions (items not recorded in any of
the above accounts but generally thought to be un-
recorded capital flows) also diminished sharply in
1972 from 1971. The net outflow was $3.8 billion in
1972 compared with $11.1 billion in 1971. A shift in
interest rate patterns over the course of the year and
temporary abatement of concern about the exchange
rate structure in most months were probably the
fundamental factors contributing to improvement in
this account.
Official Settlements- Balance
The official settlements balance registered a $10.3
billion deficit in 1972, compared to a $29.8 billion defi-
cit in 1971 and a $9.8 billion deficit in 1970. In addi-
tion to the factors mentioned above, net liquid private
capital outflows (mainly short-term assets and liabili-
ties transferred among U.S. and foreign commercial
banks) diminished in 1972, and thereby also con-
tributed to the reduction in the official settlements
deficit. Net liquid private capital flows shifted from
1971, respectively, to a net inflow of $3.7 billion in
1972. As in 1970 and most of 1971, liquid private
capital movements in 1972 wcre sensitive to domestic
and Eurodollar interest rate differentials, and in some
periods, to anticipated changes in the parity values of
the dollar relative to other major currencies. The
official settlements balance was financed in 1972 al-
most entirely by an increase in liquid liabilities to
foreign official agencies.
The reduction of the U.S. official settlements deficit
in 1972 over 1971 was composed of two diverse trends.
The trade and current account deficits were consider-
ably larger than in earlier years due primarily to the
relative cyclical positions of major nations. The effects
of the dollar devaluation of December 1971 probably
had little net impact on these deficits over the course
of the year. By contrast, the capital account deficit
diminished markedly because of the reduction in long-
and short-term capital outflows over most of the year.
However, the sterling crisis of mid-1972 and the cur-
rency speculation in early 1973 resulted in renewed
sizable outflows on capital account.
Although monetary officials devoted considerable
attention in 1972 to considering alternative solutions
to the long-run adjustment problem of the interna-
tional monetary system, foreign exchange market
pressures forced them to focus even more of their
attention on controlling large, primarily short-term,
capital flows, Lack of concensus as to the most effec-
tive means to control these flows, and in some cases
lack of sufficient goverunrental cooperation to achieve
the most desired results, led many nations to estabhsh
numerous foreign exchange controls and to allow
their exchange rates to be at least partially deter-
mined by market forces.
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